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Lukács and the Marxist  
›Living Art‹
1. Idealism and Materialism in Young 
Lukács: ›The Ruling Ideas of the Ruling 
Class‹
On 11 November 1958, T. W. Adorno published 
a thirty-page essay entitled Extorted Reconcil-
liation (Erpresste Versöhnung) on Lukács’ 1957 
The Meaning of Contemporary Realism (Gegen-
wartsbedeutung des Kritischen Realismus), which 
was later published again in Notes to Literature 
(Noten zur Literatur). It was an ideological war 
essay, a brilliant albeit somehow typical intel-
lectual product of that phase of the Cold War 
period which began in 1955 with the remilitari-
zation of West Germany as a new NATO Member 
and the politically symmetric creation of the 
Warsaw Pact. In addition to that, the previously 
unpublished The Essay as Form (Der Essay als 
Form), opening Adorno’s Notes to Literature, is 
also about Lukács. It discusses Lukács’ juvenile 
and indeed extraordinary book, Soul and Form 
(Die Seele und die Formen). Adorno’s ›compte 
rendu‹ makes us understand Lukács’ huge rele-
vance both as a philosopher and literary theorist 
in the late fifties. The Essay as Form is a kind of 
This essay draws a line of 
continuity linking Lukács’ 
early work to his later 
›official‹ role as a communist 
intellectual. Soul and Form 
(Die Seele und die Formen) 
is not read as an expression 
of Lukács’ early idealism. 
Rather, the book bears 
witness to a much more 
complex vision. Soul and 
Form may be read as the 
first surprising movement 
in Lukács’ impending 
conversion to his peculiar 
materialism. Literature and 
art ceaselessly struggle 
for freedom and autonomy 
from any, either religious 
or political, function. Yet 
at the same time, there is 
a philosophical awareness 
that forms can be created, 
and indeed used, as 
cultural tools to shape both 
individual and collective 
lives.
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general introduction to Notes to Literature through the analysis of Lukács’ 
letter to Leo Popper, which under the title On the Nature and Form of the 
Essay (Über Form und Wesen des Essays) introduces Soul and Form, Lukács’ 
1911 astounding exordium as a literary theorist.
On the Nature and Form of the Essay seems to be ages away from the 
role of the Marxist intellectual Lukács began to assume some ten years later 
with his 1920 The Theory of the Novel (Die Theorie des Romans) and History 
and Class Consciousness (Geschichte und Klassbewusstsein). Yet, as I will try 
to show, On the Nature and Form of the Essay is not that far from its author’s 
later political Marxist role and persona. On the Nature and Form of the Essay, 
for aught we can see, indeed has a high revolutionary potential. Published in 
1911, this essay defines a kind of ideological perspective not very far from 
Gramsci’s contributions to ›cultural hegemony‹ as a fundamental political 
notion first mentioned by him in October 1926 and fully developed in the 
30s.1 Of course, there are also differences. Gramsci’s approach is definitely 
and pragmatically political, and mainly concerned with the sort of pact 
between the administrators of power and those being administered. The 
pact refers to an agreement on values and principles based on what Gramsci 
calls the ›exercise of power‹, grounded in cultural hegemony. Young Lukács 
too seems to be interested in what we may define as the power of words, the 
political relevance of culture and the relationship between words and the 
life-fashioning power of culture. In both cases, the main question seems to 
be the very ›form‹ of life or, in Lukács’ own formulation, the destiny-shaping 
function of words. This essay intends to show some curious, unknown, yet 
powerful revolutionary provisions of spirit in Soul and Form, written in the 
Antebellum, eight years before Lukács’ ›conversion‹ to Marxism in 1919.2
According to Adorno, the real reasons behind Lukács’ persistent rele-
vance in literary and philosophical studies in the late 50s, after Stalin’s death, 
are to be looked for in Soul and Form. This book is indeed very far from the 
later Lukács, dangling, both in Stalin’s time and thereafter, between Party 
orthodoxy on the one side and loyalty to his own ideas on the other. We 
have no doubt as to the relevance of Lukács’ early production, which, as far 
as we can see, is not to be considered in any real contrast with Lukács’ later 
production in his Moscow years, especially during the period Karl Schlögel 
labels as the years of »terror and dream«.3 This title refers to Stalin’s time 
1 See Höbel/Gruppi: Il concetto di egemonia in Gramsci; Gerratana: Stato, partito, strumenti e 
Istituti dell’egemonia nei »Quaderni del carcere«; Fortini: Saggi ed Epigrammi (Lukács in Italia, 
pp. 194–222; Lukács Giovane: »L‘anima e le forme« – Introduzione, pp. 234–273).
2 Formally announced in Taktik und Ethik in 1919 (collected in Frühschriften II).
3 Schlögel: Terror und Traum.
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culminating in the paranoid nightmare of the three Moscow trials 1936–1938 
against Leon Trotsky and his supposed followers Grigory Zinovev, Karl 
Radek, Sergey Platonov, Nikolai Bukharin and Alexei Rykov. Against such 
a political and ideological backdrop, I intend to draw a line of continuity 
in Lukács’ philosophical production. I intend to link his indeed brilliant 
early works to his almost official role of the communist intellectual, which 
Lukács prudently practiced in later years as a political art of survival during 
the Stalin age and afterwards, up until his death in 1971, some twenty years 
before the end of the Soviet regime and the Soviet Union.
Let us begin by taking into consideration Soul and Form. Lukács’ 1911 
extraordinary juvenile work is not to be read simply as an expression of 
his early idealism. The book indeed bears witness to some other, much 
more complicated, ideological and political vision. In some sense, as we 
shall see, Soul and Form is the first step in Lukács’ impending conversion 
to materialism, yet with the idea of literature and art ceaselessly struggling 
for freedom and autonomy from either religious or political functions. It 
seems to me that, in that book, there is a background idea left unexpressed. 
Language, words, discourse or, in short, ›forms‹ can be either implicitly 
or explicitly used as cultural-revolutionary tools employed in shaping 
new ways of thinking, a new mentality and, consequently, a new mankind 
with a new destiny fashioned by new ideas. These ideas are the expression 
of the ideological transformation of the working class into a new ›ruling 
class‹, according to what can be read in Marx and Engel’s The Communist 
Manifesto: »What else does the history of ideas prove, than that intellectual 
production changes its character in proportion as material production is 
changed? The ruling ideas of each age have ever been the ideas of its ruling 
class.«4 In any given society, ruling ideas can only be the ideas of the ruling 
class. This must also mean that any class conquering power also conquers 
the power of re-forming the world, giving it a new shape: »The communist 
revolution is the most radical rupture with traditional property relations; 
no wonder that its development involves the most radical rupture with 
traditional ideas.«5
4 Marx/Engels: The Communist Manifesto, p. 55 (»Was beweist die Geschichte der Ideen anders, 
als daß die geistige Produktion sich mit der materiellen umgestaltet? Die herrschenden Ideen 
einer Zeit waren stets nur die Ideen der herrschenden Klasse.«, Manifest der Kommunistischen 
Partei, p. 62).
5 Ibid., p. 57 (»Die kommunistische Revolution ist das radikalste Brechen mit den überlieferten 
Eigentumsverhältnissen; kein Wunder, daß in ihrem Entwicklungsgange am radikalsten mit 
den überlieferten Ideen gebrochen wird.«, Manifest der kommunistischen Partei, p. 64).
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All this undoubtedly appears to be in contrast with Lukács’ hypothe-
sis of art ceaselessly struggling for its own liberation in the last chapter of 
Aesthetics I (Ästhetik I. Die Eigenart des Asthetischen).6 What is at stake in 
this book is the independence of art from any other kind of human activity. 
One might say that Lukács’ theoretical standpoint in 1963 was obviously 
distant from what he had thought some fifty years before, in 1911. It was also 
distant from what Lukács indeed did represent with his life-long political 
engagement as a Marxist intellectual. His never denied theoretical position 
is well known. Art is the ›Widerspiegelung‹ (reflection) of human society 
at a certain date, in a certain place. Art represents and, hence, fashions or 
gives form to man’s destiny. Therefore, art must also shape and show its own 
struggle in order to free itself both from its own ancient link with religion 
and its more contemporary link with politics. Art can absolve its real task 
only by being unconditioned, free and true to itself. However, in material-
ism, loyalty to the Party does matter. Ideas are the very tools as well as the 
expression of a new, changing world. Ideas change the world materially, 
in the sense that materialism itself sees and therefore culturally shapes the 
world through the elaboration of a materialistic system of thought. This 
is the most important revolutionary tool in the shaping of a new time, a 
new order of things and a new human model; the model, that is, of a new 
humanity. Young Lukács’ world to come, his communist utopia,7 was to 
be shaped by a total cultural revolution both preparing and, at the same 
time, accomplishing the advent of a new model of human being. This new 
model was meant to fashion man’s destiny, hopes, and fears through what 
one might call the ›mirror of art‹. However, the mirror of art does not only 
shape the world as it was, it also shapes a new world in a new time yet to 
come. In its own struggle for liberation, the mirror of art reflects all human 
struggles for freedom. The question we are dealing with must also entail a 
full discussion of young Lukács’ aesthetic ideology. Chez Lukács, criticism 
and literature are one and the same thing, as is clear in On the Nature and 
Form of the Essay. In this letter to Leo Popper, criticism and literature do 
converge in the idea that any kind of literary activity is ›Widerspiegelung‹ 
– Lukács’ technical aesthetic term, naming the mirroring of social reality 
in a Marxist perspective. ›Widerspiegelung‹ is also one of the key notions 
of Lukács’ later years, e.g. in his 1962/63 Aesthetics, in which it denotes the 
6 Lukács: Ästhetik I, Ch. XVI, pp. 1427–1429.
7 We are referring in particular to Taktik und Ethik, »written before the dictatorship of the Pro-
letariat«, as Lukács writes in note 1 of the essay, published in Early Writings II (Frühschriften 
II). On Lukács and utopia see Paolo Manganaro’s still important introduction to the Italian 
translation of Frühschriften (Scritti politici giovanili 1919–1968).
129
ZGB 29/2020, 125–143 Domenichelli: Marxist ›Living Art‹
mirroring of social reality from the perspective of the ›Befreiung‹ (libera-
tion) of art. Art is and must be absolute and free from any social, utilitarian 
bond, which may also mean that art must struggle for its own freedom, thus 
unveiling in its own ›Widerspiegelung‹ of that struggle, the human ›Befrei-
ung‹. Intellectual work – literature and criticism – hence has to deal with a 
kind of representation that may be, indeed must be, the ›Widerspiegelung‹ 
of the human struggle for ›Befreiung‹. As a matter of fact, all this has to deal 
strictly with the production of ideas and the way the world may be represent-
ed. The main aesthetic question revolves around the fact that these ideas of 
›the ruling ideas‹ (in Marxian terms) are no less than a way of shaping the 
world, i.e. of shaping the audience’s vision of the world. This must also imply 
influencing, if not, at least potentially, the very shaping of the way of thinking 
of the audience, and thus the shaping of their ›Weltanschauung‹, their very 
vision of the world. In other terms, the question may somehow entail the 
perception of social reality one finds, for instance, in Trotsky’s revolutionary 
utopia based on Marx and Engels’ principle clearly defined in the Manifesto: 
»The ruling ideas of each age have ever been the ideas of its ruling class.« 
That is the fundamental notion of all political power, based primarily on 
cultural revolution and fashioning of mass consensus through the creation 
of what Gramsci called ›cultural hegemony‹, the construction of which is the 
first precondition for the advent of the new world.8 Yet, to Trotsky this seems 
to be a false, deceitful perspective, based on some idealistic point of view:
The Idealists and their almost deaf and blind disciples, the Russian subjectivists, thought 
that mind and critical reason moved the world, or, in other words, that the intelligentsia 
had the task of creating the new world. As a matter of fact, in history, the mind always 
limps after reality.9
In Trotsky’s reasoning, as well as in every other more or less orthodox 
Marxist perspective, cultural change is the consequence of political change, 
even though, from a dialectical point of view it would be much easier to 
say the opposite, which is what we find again in Literature and the October 
Revolution: »The proletariat’s task, after conquering power, is to get hold of 
the cultural apparatus formerly in the hands of industry, schools, publishers, 
printing industry, theaters etc. By means of that, the proletariat must find 
their way to culture«.10 This might seem in striking contrast to Gramsci’s 
 8 On Gramsci and cultural hegemony see Gramsci: Gli intellettuali e l’organizzazione della cultura 
and also Laclau/Mouffe: Hegemony and Socialist Strategy; Cerardi: Gramsci e la costruzione 
dell’egemonia; Crehan: Gramsci; Schinello: Tutta la nostra intelligenza. For Gramsci’s texts see: 
Gramsci: Quaderni dal carcere; esp. index entry »Egemonia«. 
 9 Trotsky: Literature and Revolution.
10 Ibid.
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point of view characterized by his idea of the absolute revolutionary neces-
sity not of seizing the bourgeois cultural apparatus, but of building a new 
apparatus he calls ›cultural hegemony‹. Cultural hegemony is the proletar-
iat’s first political need from the point of view of ›Ideologiekritik‹. Cultural 
hegemony is the very fundament and first shaping principle in the creation 
of the proletarian public, collective opinion and a new collective mind in 
the new reality brought about by any new proletarian regime. Proletarians 
must find their way to culture or, better yet, to a renewal of culture, as the 
very condition of revolutionary success and the warranty of permanence 
of any revolutionary regime, which simply reverses the perspective: »The 
ruling ideas of each age have ever been the ideas of its ruling class« must 
also mean that the ideas of the (new) ruling class fashion the common 
mind, the common perception of reality and vision of the world, which, in 
a way, also means that what is being fashioned is the new social world itself.
Gramsci’s first revolutionary principle, the fashioning of a new cultural 
hegemony as a common proletarian idea of the social world, is clearly based 
on Marx and Engel’s Manifesto, together with a materialistic standpoint 
according to which society and destinies, are shaped by the dominant ideas 
of the ruling class. This, in Gramsci’s terms, corresponds to the re-shaping 
of the social world to be produced by the new revolutionary ›ruling class‹. 
Is this a perspective somehow to be found in Lukács? Certainly not, one 
ought to answer, considering the last, definitive chapter of Aesthetics I on 
the liberation of art from any subjection to religion and politics. However, 
as we have been trying to say, in its struggle for liberation art also quintes-
sentially represents all human struggles for freedom.
2. Cultural Revolution: The New media and Cultural Hegemony. 
Idealism, Materialism and Destiny Shaping
Gramsci and Lukács met neither in Vienna nor in Moscow, where both of 
them lived in the period between 1922 and 1924. Of course, they knew about 
each another. Both lived in a risky time of great changes and both took an 
active part in the shaping of a new European political perspective following 
the October revolution. However, it is even more curious that neither of 
them took any notice of the technical cultural revolution going on in their 
modernity with the new media. Neither Gramsci nor Lukács ever realized 
the political importance of the new film industry or the radio. Both were 
under strict political state control in fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, as well 
as in Stalin’s Russia, where radio and cinema indeed were new powerful 
means for the creation of cultural hegemony and the shaping of what came 
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to be called mass mind.11 The creation of Cinecittà in fascist Italy, using 
cinema, together with the radio as the most powerful propaganda instru-
ment; Goebbels’ cultural policy in Germany, with the ›Volksempfänger‹ or 
the low-cost radio set,12 and again: the cinema, radio and visual culture in 
Stalin’s Russia13 – all this tells us something important about these powerful 
means of mass mind control through the creation and handling of cultural 
hegemony and mass consensus. This may have little importance for Lukács’ 
cultural theory as he never shows any interest in propaganda, mass media, 
mass information and mass consent. Astonishingly enough, Gramsci too 
never discusses the new media and their political importance in the crea-
tion of cultural hegemony through the minds of those whom Gramsci calls 
›organic intellectuals‹, at the service of the proletariat and the revolution. In 
Gramsci’s theory, the very place for the construction of cultural hegemony 
is the school. Gramsci never considers the relevance of cinema and radio in 
the creation, shaping, and handling of mass mind consent in the interbellum 
period in Stalin’s Russia, in Hitler’s Germany and in Mussolini’s Italy. It is 
clear that radio and film industry were also important in the U.S. and that 
Hollywood’s power was impressively displayed in Europe after the end of 
World War II, when a myriad of American films was exported to Europe.
In the introductory chapter of Soul and Form, we find an interesting 
reflection on literature and life:
All writings represent the world in the symbolic terms of a destiny-relationship; every-
where, the problem of destiny determines the problem of form. This unity, this coexistence 
is so strong that neither element ever occurs without the other; here again a separation 
is possible only by way of abstraction. Therefore the separation which I am trying to 
accomplish here appears, in practice, merely as a shift of emphasis: poetry receives its 
profile and its form from destiny, and form in poetry appears always only as destiny; but 
in the works of the essayists form becomes destiny, it is the destiny-creating principle.14
Therefore, according to Lukács’ perspective, in literature, more generally in 
writing, the world and its progress in time are constantly represented in the 
11 On Gramsci, cultural hegemony and mass-mind control, see Filippini: Using Gramsci.
12 On cinema in Nazi Germany see Traub: Der Film als politisches Machtmittel; Albrecht: Natio-
nalsozialstische Filmpolitik; Spiker: Film und Kapital.
13 Kenez: The Birth of the Propaganda State; Taylor: Film Propaganda; Piretto: Gli occhi di Stalin.
14 Lukács: Soul and Form, p. 23, emphasis in the original (»Jedes Schreiben stellt die Welt im Symbol 
einer Schicksalsbeziehung dar; das Problem des Schicksals bestimmt überall das Problem der 
Form. Diese Einheit, diese Koexistenz ist so stark, daß das eine Element nie ohne das andere 
auftritt und eine Trennung ist auch hier nur in der Abstraktion möglich. Die Scheidung also, 
die ich hier zu vollziehen versuche, scheint praktisch nur ein Unterschied der Betonung zu 
sein: die Dichtung enthält vom Schicksal ihr Profil, ihre Form, die Form erscheint dort immer 
nur als Schicksal; in den Schriften der Essayisten wird die Form zum Schicksal, zum schick-
salschaffenden Prinzip.«, Die Seele und die Formen, p. 30).
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symbolic terms of some destiny-shaping effect, with the problem of destiny 
determining the problem of form or vice-versa – with form determining 
destiny, and destiny being shaped by ideas and ideas and words consequently 
affecting and shaping practical life. However, this is not what one finds in 
Lukács’ theoretical approach. To Lukács, literature, art, be it as it may, are 
the social world’s ›Widerspiegelung‹.15 Literature is no tool to be used in 
order to change the world; literature, and art, simply reflect the world. To 
Lukács, this is the warranty of art’s purity and an indispensable feature in 
keeping art clean or, so to speak, keeping it free, from any worldly trade, 
aim or influence. However, On the Nature and Form of the Essay seems to 
postulate some kind of unavoidable symmetric destiny effect. If destiny is 
strictly linked to form in literature and literature is a destiny-shaping activ-
ity, then literature and art in general must be life-fashioning activities. The 
shape of life – the life-form, determined by words and ideas, – is indeed the 
very basic principle in the creation of either common consent or common 
dissent, as the very fundament of what Gramsci calls cultural hegemony.16 
Lukács never really faces this kind of problem. His position is very clear-
ly defined once for all in the chapter on cinema in Aesthetics I, where he 
discusses and strongly disagrees with Benjamin’s idea of the vanishing of 
the ›aura‹ of the work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction.17 The 
destiny of the ›aura‹ is obviously linked to the conditions of fruition of the 
work of art and, thus, to the technology of its diffusion in late modernity 
or virtually endless post-modernity. The vanishing of the ›aura‹ is due 
to what we may call the virtually endless multiplication of the original 
›Kunstwerk‹ (work of art), the uniqueness of which is hence being erased. 
Of course, especially in late modernity, ›entre deux guerres‹, the question 
of ›aura‹ is strictly linked to the discussion of cultural hegemony as the key 
question about the creation of consensus as the necessary precondition for 
the creation and administration of political power. Lukács simply avoids 
any discussion of this point. He is not interested in the political use of art 
works or, better still, he is against any political use of art works.
15 The notion of ›Widerspiegelung‹ to be found in Engels, not in Marx, must come from Lenin (Lenin: 
Materialismus und Empiriokritizismus, pp. 56–57, 164–165, 171–173, 182–184, 201–202, 288–289). 
See also Holz: Dialektik und Widerspiegelung; see also Rockmore: Lukács fra Marx e marxismo.
16 On Gramsci’s idea of hegemony see Gruppi: Il concetto di egemonia in Gramsci; Fiori: Gramsci, 
Togliatti, Stalin; Cerardi: Gramsci e la costruzione dell’egemonia. On Gramsci and Lukács, see 
Alessandrini: La rivoluzione estetica di Antonio Gramsci e György Lukács.
17 Lukács:  Ästhetik I. On ›aura‹ see: Benjamin: Das Kunstwerk in Zeitalter seiner technischen 
Reproduzierbarkeit.
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The constantly given concurrence of form and destiny in literature – 
according to Lukács in his epistula to Leo Popper – necessarily entails that 
neither can ever occur without the other. Here again, in Lukács’ perspective, 
a separation between them is only possible by way of abstraction:
Therefore the separation I am trying to accomplish here appears, in practice, merely as a 
shift of emphasis; poetry receives its profile and its form from destiny, and form in poetry 
always appears only as destiny; yet, in a writer’s work, the essay form becomes destiny, it is 
the destiny-creating principle. This difference means the following: destiny lifts things up 
outside the world of things, accentuating the essential ones and eliminating the inessential; 
but form sets limits around a substance which otherwise would dissolve like air in the 
All. In other words, destiny comes from the same source as everything else, it is a thing 
among things, whereas form – seen as something finished, i.e. from the outside – defines 
the limits of the immaterial. Because the destiny which orders things is flesh of their 
flesh and blood of their blood, destiny is not to be found in the writings of the essayist. 
For destiny, once stripped of its uniqueness and accidental development in time, is just 
as airy and immaterial as all the rest of the incorporeal matter of these writings, and is no 
more capable of giving them form than they themselves possess any natural inclination 
or possibility of condensing themselves into form.18
It seems to me that this statement contains every either conscious or uncon-
scious implication of Lukács’ complex literary perspective. The ›destiny‹ in 
question here does not refer to any lived life; it refers instead to life’s form 
in literature and, thus, to the literary shaping of destiny either in poetry, 
for instance, or in critical writing. However, in poetry, i.e. in verse writing, 
as Lukács has it in his letter to Leo Popper, destiny is form, and form is the 
end, nay, it is the aim itself of poetry, which also means it is poetry’s destiny, 
that is to say poetry’s definitive destiny-figure. Thus conversely, in Lukács, 
form must become destiny and form, indeed, must be the destiny-creating 
principle. This, in a way, would also seem to precisely define the scope, and 
clear-cut borderlines of both literature and literary science, as well as the 
nature of their connection with the living world being thus given its form.
However, not only in the years of the first mass-media revolution, in 
1920s and 1930s, but also in a broader time perspective, the literary, artistic 
18 Lukács: Soul and Form, p. 23 (»Und dieser Unterschied bedeutet folgendes: das Schicksal hebt 
Dinge aus der Welt der Dinge hervor, betont die gewichtigen und scheidet die unwesentlichen 
aus; die Formen aber umgrenzen einen Stoff, der sich sonst luftartig im All auflösen würde. 
Das Schicksal kommt also von dort, woher alles andere kommt, als Ding unter die Dinge, 
während die Form – als etwas Fertiges angesehen, von außen also – dem Wesensfremden die 
Grenzen bestimmt. Weil das Schicksal, das die Dinge ordnet, Fleisch von ihrem Fleisch und 
Blut aus ihrem Blute ist, darum gibt es klein Schicksal in den Schriften der Essayisten. Denn 
das Schicksal, seiner Einmaligkeit und Zufälligkeit entblößt, ist gerade so luftig immateriell, 
wie jeder andere körperlose Stoff dieser Schriften; kann ihnen also gerade so wenig eine Form 
geben, wie sie selbst jeder natürlichen Neigung und Möglichkeit einer Verdichtung zur Form 
entbehren.«, Die Seele und die Formen, pp. 30–31).
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form/shape-creating principle being evoked seems to have some broader 
political application, as the power to shape society in the time to come. 
Indeed, this is the very principle on which the construction of cultural 
hegemony and mass-consent is based, offering the intellectual, the artist, 
a wide, and indeed pragmatic application field. Clearly enough, Lukács’ 
perspective may be easily turned upside-down to say that art and literature 
– by giving form to destiny in a literary sense, as it were – can also shape 
and give form to human lives, behaviours, ways of thinking, expectations, 
wishes, hopes, fears and, yes, opinions. They are, of course, just words, yet 
they do concretely shape fictional destinies and, thus, also offer themselves 
as potential life-fashioning cultural patterns. This is the main question 
when one discusses cultural hegemony as the conditio sine qua non and 
very fundament of any political regime. 
3. The Revolutionary Living Art
All this may seem close enough to the kind of revolutionary utopia such 
as the mass expectational perspective we find in Trotsky’s writings. What 
takes its utopian shape in Trotsky’s writings is the human spirit; the very 
fulfilment of the materialist revolution is a deep spiritual change in the 
human mind. It is a trans-evaluation of all values and a radical renewal of 
human identity through total self-awareness. This is what we can read in 
The Art of the Revolution, in the conclusion of which we find the idea or 
the dream of a new revolutionary kind of ars vivendi. It is a revolutionary 
›téchne tou biou‹ exactly focused on επιμέλεια εαυτού (as in Plato’s Alcib-
iades I), yet a new kind of ›cura sui‹, self-discipline through which any 
human subject can fully master him/herself, thus becoming a new kind of 
superman/woman. This is not to be understood in the Nietzschean sense 
of the triumph of some kind of bourgeois individualism. One might rather 
say that it is the triumph of Marxian collectivism as the final achievement 
of total self-consciousness. »Man«, Trotsky writes in the chapter »Revolu-
tionary and Socialist Art« of his Literature and Revolution, »will make it his 
purpose to master his own feelings, […] to create a higher social biologic 
type, or, if you please, a superman«. Hence, through Lukács and Trotsky, 
we find ourselves captured in Gramsci’s reasoning on cultural hegemony to 
be interpreted as the shaping tool of the new revolutionary human being. 
Cultural hegemony may be defined as the whole of notions and ideas to be 
taught and spread in a given society in order to define and control value 
systems, as well as ethic, social and political principles. Cultural hegemony 
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is both an ideological construct and a mental discipline to be learned, exer-
cised and used in order to fashion a new human model. This is the base of a 
new society, with new, both personal and collective expectations, grounded 
in life-construction as the shaping of life-form; the shaping, that is, of both 
personal and collective destinies.
The revolution must change the idea of the world; ideas must change the 
world. This is to be done materially, in the sense that materialism shapes the 
new world culturally, and all this through the elaboration of a materialistic 
system of thought, to be considered as the most important revolutionary 
tool, fashioning a new time, a new order of things and a new collective model 
of human being; the model of a new humanity. This reasoning about ideas 
of the world, destiny and form as the very destiny-creating principle is also 
what we consider Lukács’ aesthetic, literary path to the formulation of the 
relationship between the world of ideas and the world to be shaped materially 
by a total cultural revolution. This is inscribed in Lukács’ early insistence 
on intellectual guidance in his juvenile essays on the revolution and the 
revolutionary role of intellectuals in Early Writings II: On the Question of 
Organization of the Intellectuals (Frühschriften II: Zur Organisationsfrage der 
Intellektuellen).19 As a matter of fact, almost the entire book is comprised of 
essays on the revolutionary function of ›intellectual workers‹. The question 
we are dealing with entails a full discussion on Lukács totalizing idea that 
criticism and literature are two modes of the same intellectual activity. They 
must be more than mere ›Widerspiegelung‹: Lukács’ aesthetic principium 
primum, and sole definition of any literary product, according to which 
literature is the reflection, the mirroring of social reality. In On Nature and 
Form of the Essay, both literature and criticism are not only forms mirror-
ing forms, but can also create forms, re-forming the world, and differently 
fashioning new destinies.
4. Re-presentation and ›Widerspiegelung‹
In a Marxist orthodox perspective, involving the working class first of all, 
›Widerspiegelung‹ as the aesthetic principium primum must entail not only 
the imitation but, somehow, also the shaping or the cultural re-shaping of 
the world’s image, the material reshaping of the world in the minds and 
expectations of people and, thus, also in social reality. Yet, in Lukács’ 1962 
Aesthetik I, the function of all arts is not and cannot be any re-shaping of the 
19 Lukács: Zur Organisationsfrage der Intellektuellen; Lukács: Zur Frage des Bildungsarbeit.
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world, together with time and life. The function of art is what Lukács calls 
›Widerspiegelung‹, which is his aesthetic key-word, primarily referring, or 
so it would seem, not to any provocation of any change in the future, but 
to the realistic mirroring of social reality in the present. This would imply 
that literature, art and culture cannot play any primary revolutionary role in 
social change. However, we know that intellectual work, literature, criticism 
and political writing has to deal with a certain kind of representation that 
may turn out not to be only the mirroring or ›Widerspiegelung‹ of reality, 
but also a contribution to the world’s transformation. Which is to say that 
Lukács’ ›Widerspiegelung‹ may also refer to a changing society, with the 
aesthetic reflection considered not only as the re-presentation of the actual 
present world, but also as the evocation of the future being longed for and 
planned to be shaped and built as history. Hence, ›Widerspiegelung‹ might 
refer exactly to the fashioning of destiny through what Lukács calls ›form‹. 
As a matter of fact, this is in strict connection with the production of ideas 
and also connected to the way the world may be or is to be represented. 
Representation is the very form of the memory of the past conceived both 
as the preparation of the present world and the paradoxical reminiscent 
representation of historia futura. From this perspective, dominant ideas are 
nothing other than a way of shaping every collective vision of the world, 
which must also somehow imply the intention of influencing or directly 
shaping the way of thinking. In other words, the question posed may some-
how entail the vision of the world one can find in Trotsky’s revolutionary 
utopia. This somewhat out-of-tune Nietzschean suggestion is the utopian 
seal through which the revolutionary project bringing about the revolu-
tionary transmutation of the human being is the full achievement of what 
we may call the Marxist revolutionary ›living art‹.
Be it as it may, Trotsky’s oddly idealistic architecture of utopia is based 
on the fundamental idea that the human world has always been shaped 
by images, words and ideas. This recalls Antonio Gramsci’s all-involving 
formulation of the necessity of the construction of cultural hegemony as 
the main and basic re-foundation revolutionary principle, without which 
no power can establish itself. In a Marxian sense, the basic social struggle 
is not a struggle for freedom – it is the struggle for power, with proletari-
an power necessarily replacing bourgeois power and proletarian cultural 
hegemony replacing bourgeois hegemony. This is clearly shown in Stalin’s 
use of propaganda as the main instrument of the creation of consensus. 
Art, literature and the printing industry were involved in the creation of 
the new world and the early mass-media new age, with the radio and film 
industry used as new political tools in the fashioning of mass consensus in 
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fascist Italy, Nazi Germany as well as in Stalin’s Soviet Union. A last pow-
erful example to be mentioned is the invasion of American films in Europe 
after World War II.20 Consent-creating tools were, and still are, important 
in any kind of regime; yet, almost none of the important intellectuals in 
Europe ›entre-deux guerres‹ seem to have been fully aware of this. Not even 
Gramsci seems to have ever fully realized the new political importance of 
those he calls organic intellectuals in the early mass-media age. He never 
seems to have fully realized the all-permeating role to be played by the new 
media, and by what in the early media-modernity the Russians called the 
intelligentsia. To Gramsci, in any case, we owe the sociological, and political 
definition of organic intellectuals21 as a category of subjects working in the 
fields of communication and education (schools, newspapers, the press, 
radio, theatre, cinema as the new mass-consensus-creating tools, as well 
as television, and later, of course, in our present, the new reality-creation 
nature of the Internet, as the very technical base of any given power).
5. Cultural Hegemony, Propaganda, Autonomy: Form as Destiny
Men of power in the interbellum period, such as Stalin for instance, but also 
Hitler, Mussolini, Churchill, Roosevelt had wide-open eyes. They saw the 
political importance of propaganda and knew the huge power of the new 
media, as shown by Stalin’s attention to radio and film and the importance 
of cinema and the radio in fascist Italy and in Hitler’s Germany.22 Stalin was 
also well aware of the importance of writers as is shown by what happened 
to Bulgakov, who experienced tremendous difficulties with the regime 
and wanted to expatriate, when, on 18 April 1930, he received the famous 
phone-call from Stalin and consequently decided to stay.23
For the title of his book Engineers of the Soul (Ingenieurs van de Ziel), 
Frank Westerman takes Stalin’s cultural label-sentence pronounced at 
a meeting of intellectuals at Gorky’s place, on 26 October 1932, during 
Stalin’s cruel repression of the Kulaki’s protest in Ukraine, coinciding with 
the 1936–1938 Moscow trials against Trotskyists. There were writers such 
as Mikhail Alexandrovich Sholokhov (Quietly Flows the Don, 1925–32), 
Alexander Fadeev (Defeat 1927; The Last of the Udegel, 1927) and Fyodor 
20 Merziger: Americanised, Europeanised or Nationalized.
21 Gramsci: Quaderni del carcere, Vol. III, pp. 1550–1551.
22 Gerd: Nationalistische Filmpolitik; Spiker: Film und Kapital; Argentieri: L’occhio del regime; 
Brunetta: Cinema italiano tra le due guerre; Taylor: Film Propaganda.
23 See Chudakowa: Michail Bulgakov. Cronaca di una vita, Chapter »Stalin benefattore«.
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Gladkov (Cement, 1925), all of them close enough to the Party’s (i.e. Sta-
lin’s) official point of view, with the obvious absence of other politically 
out-of-tune writers and poets such as Boris Pasternak, Mikhail Bulgakov, 
Osip Mandelstam, Anna Achmatova. On that occasion Stalin is reported 
to have said: »Our tanks are useless if the souls of those driving them are 
made of clay. This is why I say that the production of souls is more impor-
tant than the production of tanks […], and I raise my glass to you writers, 
because you are the engineers of the soul«.24 In Lukács’ Aesthetic I, one, not 
surprisingly, finds in Chapter X, paragraph VI, dedicated to The Struggle for 
Art’s Liberation (Der Befreiungskampf der Kunst), a long analytical passage 
on Stalin’s 1932 toast at Gorky’s place. It is an important passage in which 
Lukács’ theoretical standpoint of the absolute nature of art is defined once for 
all, together with other standpoints of Lukács’ indeed surprising definition 
of Stalin’s ideological aesthetic perspective as ›bürgerlich‹ (in Lukács’ own 
term). Stalin’s whole idea of art, according to Lukács, is utilitarian since 
all art is to be used mechanically in order to modify the human soul and 
better the way it serves – from Stalin’s perspective – practical, social and 
political ends. Quite consequently, Lukács writes that art is being deprived 
of its universality and its plurisignification.25 Indeed, one might object that 
Lukács’ idea of literary, cultural, ideological criticism as limitless, universal, 
multilateral and absolutely free might also sound as a sort of common-place 
idea in a bourgeois system of values. Thus, paragraph III of Chapter 10 (part 
VI of the discussion on mimesis) – at the end of the first volume of Lukács’ 
Aesthetics, clearly prepares the conclusion of the whole work in Chapter 
XVI of the second volume: The Struggle for Art’s Liberation.26 In that chap-
ter, Lukács’ reasoning on the relationship between art and religion is based 
entirely on the aesthetically all-including idea of ›Widerspiegelung‹. Thus, 
in Lukács’ conclusive discussion on the liberation of art, still in connection 
with Soul and Form, the all-connecting threads and passe-partout concepts 
of his reasoning are brought together.
6. Destiny, Form and Living Art 
In Soul and Form, there is a recurrent mention of ars vivendi, the Platonic 
τέχυη του βιου, life-craft, proceeding from επιμέλεια εαυτού or cura sui, self-
care, also known in Foucault as ›soin de soi‹, the teaching of which is the aim 
24 Ibid., p. 34.
25 Lukács: Ästhetik I, p. 803.
26 Der Befreiungskampf der Kunst (ibid., Vol. 2: Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen 2, pp. 675–872).
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of any philosophy. The subject’s self-fashioning through self-government is 
the conditio sine qua non for the government of others. One may indeed 
say that the real subject of Lukács’ book is what Foucault much later calls 
the technology of the self or self-government, the only means by which can 
one learn how to rule the others.27 This is the real hidden, perhaps somehow 
unknowing subject of Soul and Form. This is also our main concern here 
since the question we are discussing is exactly the power of words on life 
or the way in which words can affect life and become, so to speak, flesh:
Life is nothing, work is all. Life is mere accident; work is necessity itself. […] To some, 
one direction is the goal, the other the danger; one is the compass, the other the desert; 
one the work, the other the life. Between Life and Work a deadly struggle is being fought 
for a victory joining the two opposing camps […].28
In Chapter III, The Foundering of Form against Life (on Søren Kierke-
gaard and Regine Olsen), we find a formidable incipit, involving the value 
of form in life, and thus the life-shaping ›aesthetic‹ question of destiny:
What is the life-value of a gesture? Or, to put it another way, what is the value of form 
in life, the life-creating, life-enhancing value of form? A gesture is nothing more than 
a movement which clearly expresses something unambiguous. Form is the only way of 
expressing the absolute in life.29 
On Novalis and romanticism we find the most precise reference to life-
craft: »The Romantic art of living was poetry as action; they transformed 
the deepest and most inward laws of poetic art into imperatives from life.«30
Destiny, as it were, is what extracts things from their thingness by ac-
centuating their essential traits while eliminating the inessential. Destiny 
thus becomes form, and form sets limits around a substance which would 
otherwise dissolve. Destiny is the agency shaping time (life) and addressing 
time (life) to an end. Therefore, form or the artistic principle must also shape 
27 All this obviously enough recalls Michel Foucault’s long research on επιμέλεια εαυτού in Le 
gouvernement des vivants, L’hermenéutique du sujet, Le gouvernement de soi et des autres, Le 
souci de soi.
28 Lukács: Soul and Form, p. 44 (»Das Leben ist nichts, das Werk ist alles, das Leben ist lauter Zufall 
und das Werk ist die Notwendigkeit selbst. […] Für solche Menschen bildet die eine Richtung 
das Ziel und die andere die Gefahr, die eine den Kompaß, die andere die Wildnis, die eine das 
Werk, die andere das Leben. Und Kampf auf Leben und Tod wütet zwischen beiden um den 
Sieg […].«, Die Seele und die Formen, pp. 48–49).
29 Ibid. (»Der Lebenswert einer Geste. Anders gesagt: der Wert der Form im Leben, der lebenschaf-
fende, lebensteigernde Wert der Formen. Die Geste ist nur jene Bewegung, die das Eindeutige klar 
ausdrückt, die Form der einzige Weg des Absoluten im Leben.«, Die Seele und die Formen, p. 56).
30 Soul and Form, p. 66 (»Die Lebenskunst der Romantik ist eine zur Tat gewordene Poesie; aus dem 
innerlichsten und tiefsten Gesetzen der Dichtkunst wurden hier die Imperative des Lebens.«, 
Die Seele und die Formen, p. 107).
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history as a struggle for some determined social good or to some end on 
the base of another principle: power, freedom, justice, and/or, strategically, 
the affirmation of a group, or a class of subjects. Clearly enough Lukács, 
in this perspective, may seem to assume an idealistic point of view, and, 
indeed, idealism in Lukács is a permanent intellectual temptation. The 
question of ›form‹ in the works of such an important Marxist theorist as 
Lukács must involve the political question of propaganda and ideology as 
the tools to be used in order to shape social reality politically. As we can 
read in the Communist Manifesto, the »ruling ideas in all ages have always 
been the ideas of the ruling class«. Stalin was undoubtedly in line with Marx 
and Engel’s Manifesto, in which the revolutionary relevance of ideas and 
culture are clearly affirmed. The leading ideas of any given age are the ideas 
of the ruling class and the ruling class, of course, in the Manifesto, must be 
the proletariat, i.e. the working class. This is also why writers must be the 
›engineers of the human soul‹, and art – somehow unexpectedly – must be 
or become what we may define a life-prescription activity, i.e. an orthodox, 
›revolutionary‹, exemplary communist activity.
What is being evoked here is the dream of a new life being shaped by 
the collective ideas of the new revolutionary ruling class. In what Gramsci 
calls the proletarian cultural hegemony, writers must become ›organic‹ 
intellectuals. As such they are to be entrusted with the function of shaping 
new revolutionary souls and destinies. Therefore, literature, literary criti-
cism and all performing arts, cinema and the radio are meant to become 
revolutionary tools to be used in order to shape a different human reality 
and a new time of a new both individual and collective life. 
Lukács’ 1911 Soul and Form is grounded in two basic concepts, ›form‹ 
and ›destiny‹, or destiny as the very form of experience. It is the same kind 
of idea we also find in reading Leon Trotsky’s Chapter VI on proletarian 
culture and art in Literature and Revolution, a series of articles published 
in 1913–14. In this book, we find the idea that the task of new proletarian 
culture is the shaping, in literature, of a new political struggle and, in-
deed, of a new revolutionary living art. The conclusion of Chapter VIII of 
Literature and Revolution is focused exactly on ›the art of the revolution‹ 
and the establishment of a socialist state and a new socialist way of life. 
In Trotsky’s description of the transformation of man according to the 
new socialist living art, for example, we seem to find something similar 
to what Plotinus described as the sculpture of the self.31 The question we 
are dealing with is the transformation of ›téchne tou biou‹ into ›téchne 
31 Enneades, I, 6.9.
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politiké‹ (ars politica). From Plato’s point of view in Alcibiades I, ›téchne 
politiké‹ (the art of politics) is one and the same thing with ›téchne tou 
biou‹ (life-craft).
The question of either literary or political discourse form shaping life 
and destiny is the subject of On the Nature and Form of the Essay apropos lit-
erature as a destiny-shaping activity. Form, as Lukács writes, is destiny – and 
destiny, as the very form of any given life, can be shaped either by external 
given conditions, or by man’s will. Yet form is primarily defined either by 
words or images as sensible collective memory traces. The preservation and 
interpretation of those traces is part of the task intellectuals, poets and artists 
are entrusted with in view of the fashioning influence their version of the 
past and present can have on the collective future. As we know, Lukács did 
not share that idea. He would probably also disagree with Gramsci’s idea of 
›organic‹ intellectuals and artists as builders of cultural-hegemony consensus 
apparatuses as the very necessary foundation both for the preparation and 
stabilization of the revolution, even though in young Lukács’ Early Writings 
II (Frühschriften II), the revolutionary role of the intellectual is a kind of ›fil 
rouge‹ knitting together all the reasoning of the book.
Despite the fact that Lukács and Gramsci met neither in Vienna in the 
early twenties nor later in Moscow, Lukács’ early concern for the role and 
function of the intellectual recalls Gramsci’s own concern for the guiding role 
of the intellectual in the workers’ movement. Of course, this was a subject 
à l’ordre du jour in the early revolutionary days, as shown, for instance, by 
Sylvia Pankhurst’s article Education of the masses, probably first published 
in »Workers Dreadnought«, and re-printed as a »Dreadnought Pamphlet« 
in 1918. Form – in young Lukács – is destiny and destiny is the very form of 
any given life. Human destiny is not simply what happens; destiny refers to 
both the personal and the collective meaning of what happens. This is part 
of the task intellectuals are entrusted with in view of the shaping influence 
their version of the past can have on the collective future. Thus, intellectuals 
– Stalin’s ›engineers of the soul‹ – can also be described as the ›shapers‹ of 
collective class identities. In Early Writings II, the introductory question is 
about the guiding political role of ›intellectual workers‹ deciding the prac-
tical direction to be taken by the workers’ movement. Gramsci probably 
had no opportunity to read Lukács’ contributions, which, however, can 
show us that the problem being posed was already being discussed in the 
early revolutionary period. Gramsci’s discourse on the role of the ›organic‹ 
intellectual, after all, faces the same questions posed by young Lukács in 
Soul and Form on what we may define the socio-political architecture and 
nature and political function of intellectual and artistic work re-fashioning 
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of the world through words, and, in Early Writings II, on intellectual guid-
ance and political organization, shaping collective destiny,32 lest we forget… 
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